For N possible customers or agents and N price-wise identical (one customer a day) restaurants (or any other type of service providers), we study the collective dynamical states of choices. Each evening the choice problem of any agent is to go to a restaurant. The agent makes this choice based on two things (a) his/her own past experiences and (b) the past restaurant utilisation records (available to everyone). Each agent makes his/her choice independent of others, (no interaction among the agents). If more than one agent turns up in any particular restaurant, one of them is randomly selected by the restaurant and the rest do not get any dinner that evening. Although the prices are the same for all the restaurants, there is a prevailing opinion across agents about the preference rankings of these restaurants and it is commonly shared by all the N agents. Of the N N possible states, only N ! states are "socially efficient" or Pareto efficient in the sense that no agent can be made better off without making any other agent worse off. This is achieved when all the agents get their dinners. In the absence of mutual interaction across agents, occurrence of such a Pareto efficient state has a very low probability. However, given the common preference ranking of the restaurant, even under any Pareto optimal state, except for the agent in the highest ranked restaurant that evening, all remaining N − 1 agents are dissatisfied and attempt to change the state, thereby moving to (exponentially many; N → ∞) "socially inefficient" states where many do not get their dinners (and that many restaurants waste their foods). Hence there is no "absorbing" state for the dynamics of the system and the daily fluctuations in the underutilisation of the services (number of people not getting dinner on any evening or equivalently the number of restaurants wasting their food) is found to be Gaussian in the cases considered, although it may show power law behavior in other cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the earlier version of the Kolkata Restaurant Problem [1] as a generalisation of the El Farol Bar Problem [2] and the consequent Minority Game Problem [3] , we introduce here a very simple version of the game: the Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) problem. This is an N agent game, where N can be macroscopically large. The model is intrinsically dynamical in the sense that, the system never converges to any of the states and most of the time, the system passes through "Collectively or Socially Inefficient" states or solutions, where most of the people do not get food and, consequently, many restaurants go unutilised every evening.
II. THE PROBLEM
Let us assume that there are N restaurants in Kolkata and each can accommodate a fixed number of customers, normalised to unity (without any loss of generality). Let there be exactly N customers or agents in the city. We assume that although each of the restaurants costs the same for a dinner, there is a prevailing opinion across the customers about the preference rankings of these restaurants. Also, if there are more than one agent (prospective customer) arriving in any of these restaurants any evening, one of them is chosen randomly and the rest do not get any dinner that evening [4] . We assume that while deciding for the choice of the restaurant any evening, there is no mutual interaction (consultation) among the agents, and that they decide simultaneously on the basis of past "experiences" available to each of the agent. There are N N possible scenarios of the customer choices, of which most are "socially inefficient" in the sense that there exists at least one agents not getting dinner and equivalently, there is at least one restaurant without a customer. There are exactly N ! (i.e., a fraction exp[−N ] as N → ∞) choices which correspond to "socially efficient" utilisation of the restaurants and all the customers getting their dinners. In this case, each agent ends up in a different restaurant (certainly not the best choice for N − 1 of the agents, not even the second best choice for N − 2 agents and so on) and each one gets their respective dinners that evening (to their liking or not; although they all pay the same price for their dinners). Even if such a state appears any evening, it gets destabilised in the next evening as the N − 1 customers (who could not get into the highest ranking one), try to move to some other restaurant next evening and the whole system breaks down to any of the infinitely many (exp [N ] ; N → ∞) socially inefficient states, where many of the agents remain hungry.
There can be no fixed point result for the problem and the game continues dynamically forever. This is because, given the same ranking over restaurants across agents, even in any socially efficient state there exists agents (N − 1 to be exact) who find it profitable to deviate to a better restaurant in the next evening. The system moves to an inefficient state characterized by overcrowding at higher ranking restaurants (absence of any "absorbing" state). The system will therefore transit forever occasionally passing through "socially efficient" state. We investigate here some of the optimally utilised states of the system, the average occupation fraction of the restaurants in any evening (utilisation fraction) and their fluctuations.
III. PURE OR MIXED STRATEGIES FOR TWO AGENT GAMES
The restaurant problem, developed so far under the assumptions of (a) no mutual interaction across agents and (b) common preference ranking of the restaurants, can also be modeled as a single shot strategic game repeated every evening. In particular one can construct a class of one shot strategic form game whose set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria coincides with the set of all Pareto optimal states.
Let |N | = n and u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ) ∈ ℜ n represent the utility (in terms of money) associated with each restaurant which is common to all agents. Assume without loss of generality that u 1 < u 2 < . . . < u n so that the N -th restaurant is the best for all agents, (N − 1)-th restaurant is the second best and so on. Let G(u) = (N, S, U ) represent a one shot game in strategic form where N = {1, . . . , n} is the finite (may be large) set of players, S is the (common) strategy space of all agents where S = {1, . . . , n} is the strategy space for each agent where a typical strategy s(i) = k denotes the strategy that the i-th agent goes to the k-th restaurant. For each strategy vector s = (s (1), . . . , s(n)) ∈ S n , the payoff to player i is given by
is a Nash equilibrium of the game
Let us consider now the compare some two player version of these games G(u) with some standard games like Prisoner's Dilemma or the Battle of Sexes [7] . The prisoner's dilemma is a typical non-zero-sum game in which two players (called here "Prisoners") may each "cooperate" (C) or "defect" (D; i.e. betray) the other player. If one puts one prisoner's choices of cooperation or defection along the rows, while those for the other along the columns, the payoff matrix can, for example, be expressed as
Obviously strategy C is strictly dominated by strategy D for both players. Hence D is the unique strictly dominant strategy for both players, implying that (D, D) is the only the only Nash equilibrium [7] of the game of Prisoner's Dilemma. The unique equilibrium for this game is not a Pareto optimal solution: rational choice leads the two players to both defecting even though each player's individual reward would be greater if they both cooperated. In equilibrium therefore, each prisoner chooses to betray the other even though both would be better off by cooperating. The game battle of sexes is the following: one evening wife and husband wants to either go to the Theater (T) or to the Cinema (C). The wife prefers to go to the Theater (T), while the husband prefers cinema (C), but both dislike to get separated. Hence the payoff matrix can be the following:
There are two pure strategy and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria of this game. The two pure strategy equilibria are (C,C) and (T,T). Let us consider a single shot two player KPR problem G(u) with u 1 = 1 and u 2 = 2. The payoff matrix can be the following:
This game has three pure strategy Nash equilibria. Note that for this game going to the higher ranked restaurant is a weakly dominant strategy for both players and this results in a payoff of (1,1) which is an inefficient state. However, the pair of strategy combinations that leads to the two Pareto optimal states are also pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Now let us consider another single shot two player KPR problem G(u ′ ) with u For the game G(u ′ ) there are exactly two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Moreover, these equilibria corresponds to the two Pareto optimal states. In general, can we identify the class of games G(u) for which the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria coincides with the set of all Pareto optimal states of the KPR problem? The proposition (that follows) provides a complete answer to this question.
Consider now the general one shot strategic form game of the KPR problem. Given any vector of utilities u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∈ ℜ n with the property that u 1 < u 2 < . . . < u n , we can associate a one shot strategic form game G(u) = (N, S, U ). Let G be the class of all such games. Let G ⊂ G be the sub-class of one shot games G(u) = (N, S, U ) whose set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria (pure strategy equilibria of the game G(u) = (N, S, U ) with the property that no player can benefit from unilateral deviation) coincides with the set of all Pareto optimal states (states under which all agents gets his/her dinner).
Proposition 1 G(u)
Note that the games described in this section are all static or one shot games. While the KPR problem defined in the earlier section for general N is intrinsically a dynamical one. However, it can definitely be represented as the repeated game where in each stage we have the same one shot game G(u) ∈ G being played. Players, update their strategies in stage t using just the history of the game played till t − 1 assuming that the history of the game is common knowledge.
IV. STOCHASTIC STRATEGIES FOR MANY AGENT GAMES
Let us consider some simple stochastic strategies for the KPR problem. Here again all the N agents take up some stochastic strategy independent of each other. We consider the limit N → ∞ in this section.
(a) Let us first assume that each day, each of the N players or agents are choosing randomly any of the N restaurants such that if any of the restaurant is chosen by m agents any day (m > 1), the restaurant chooses one of them randomly, and the rest m − 1 agents go without any dinner that day. Let us further assume, there is no memory or learning by any agent and each evening the same process is repeated. What is the statistics of the fraction f of the restaurants utilised (or people getting food) any day?
If we assume that there are λN agents (λ = 1 in KPR problem) and each restaurant is chosen without any prejudice, then the probability p of choosing any is 1/N . The probability P (m) that any restaurant is chosen simultaneously by m agents is therefore given by Poisson distribution
In other words, the fraction of restaurants not chosen any evening is given by P (m = 0) = exp(−λ), giving the average fraction of restaurants occupiedf
in the KPR problem, for such random and independent choices by the agents. The distribution D(f ) of the fraction utilised any day will be a Gaussian around the average given above. This is clearly seen in the simulation results in Fig. 1 for N = 1000.
(b) When we assume that the f N number of agents who got their dinner on any evening (t) decides to get their next day (t + 1)-th evening dinner in the best ranking restaurant (price being same, and being fortunate to get dinner the evening before!) Obviously, one of them will get into the highest ranked restaurant, and others will miss. The rest N − f N agents will try independently for the N − 1 restaurants available that day, following the same strategy as in (2), (3) and (6)). The data points are (+), ( ) and ( ) for cases (a), (b) and (c) respectively.
case (a). If f t denotes the fraction of people getting their dinner on day t, then the recursion relation will simply be (following Eq. (2)):
giving the fixed point fractionf ≃ 0.43. This again compares well with the Monte Carlo results for the Gaussian distribution D(f ) around the above value off , shown in Fig. 1 . (c) In the third case considered, we assume that the people getting food in any restaurant on evening t, remain there for one more day (up to (t + 1)-th evening) and they all compete for getting into the best ranking restaurant on (t + 2)th evening. The agents who could not get into any restaurant on evening t try for the vacant restaurants on evening (t + 1), using the same stochastic strategy as in (a). Hence the fraction f t on any evening t of the people occupying any restaurant consists of two parts: fraction x t−1 of the people already continuing in their randomly selected restaurant the earlier day and the fraction x t of people who have chosen today. As such, using Eqn. (2),
Since the fraction x t chosen today is given by the fractionf in Eqn. (2) where N (1 − x t−1 ) left out agents are choosing randomly out of N (1 − x t−1 ) vacant restaurants. The next day, the fraction f t+1 will be given by
If we assume that on the average, f t+1 =f = f t , then x t = x and
or x ≃ 0.38, givingf ≃ 0.77, as can be seen in the Monte Carlo simulation results in Fig. 1 . The fluctuations in the occupation density or utilisation fraction D(f ) is again Gaussian around the most probable occupation fraction derived here.
V. DISCUSSION
It may be noted that if there would be no ranking of the restaurants, the dynamics would converge to an absorbing state easily, where everyone gets their dinner from one of the restaurants and the customers do not change their choices and continue to go those restaurants (misuse measure thus converges to zero and will have no further fluctuation). This is because, even if everybody starts by random choices among all the N restaurants, and several restaurants get more than one prospective customer and choose one of them each for their own restaurant, the rest going hungry that evening comes to know next evening of the restaurants which went unutilised last evening and chooses from them, while those who got their dinners last night continues to go there. Soon, they converge and each find one restaurant to get their dinner and the dynamics effectively stops there. This is also the case if the agents have heterogeneous preference rankings. Here, only the dynamics would continue a little longer until every one finds the restaurant of their own choice (or best choice). However, if there is any universal preference ranking (shared by all), then any such state, long before their convergence to full utilisation, would get destabilised and even the state with full utilisation is not acceptable for N − 1 number of the participating agents and they move away for another state, leading to perpetual dynamics of the system with large fluctuations in the measure of daily misuse. If each agent randomly chooses his/her restaurant every evening, ignoring any experience and information, then the misuse measure statistics will obviously be Gaussian as seen in case (a) (Sec IV). Even in the modified cases considered in cases (b) and (c) there, the average utilisation fractionf (giving the average number of people getting dinner, or the average number of restaurants having customers, any evening) could be analytically calculated and the distributions are seen to be Gaussian.
For some other kinds of "learning" by the agents, we may expect the statistics (of the number of people going without any dinner; unemployment of the people or under-utilisation of the resources/restaurants) to have power law fluctuations (cf. [2, 3, 5, 6] ). This is indicated by the experiments on the statistics on the length of waiting-lists for hospital consultants [5, 6] , where also people do not want to wait for longtime for any consultant and would go to the next one (ranking next in his/her choice; may be heterogeneous). Because of this heterogeneity in ranking and the absence of "learning" from the experience last time(s) and the general availability of informations in our problem, this waiting-list problem is quite different from ours. Of course, if the agents are allowed to consult among themselves, soon a periodically organised state (with periodicity N ) would set in where each one in turn gets dinner in the highest ranking restaurant and all get their dinners every evening. For binary values of the ranking, the problem effectively reduces to that for N = 2, discussed later.
In short, we introduce here a simpler version of the Kolkata Restaurant Problem defined earlier [1] : For N customers and N price wise identical restaurants (each able to accommodate at most one customer per evening, chosen randomly if there are more than one customer), each customer makes independent choice for the restaurant every evening, based on his/her previous experience and the generally available information (no mutual consultation) and also the preference ranking of the restaurants (identical for each of the N customers and remaining unchanged over time). There are N N possible scenarios of the customer choices, of which most are "socially inefficient" (many going without food and that many restaurants going without any customer). Out of these, exactly N ! (i.e., a fraction exp[−N ] as N → ∞) choices or efficient states/solutions correspond to full utilisation of the restaurants and all the customers getting their dinners. However, none of them correspond to any stable states, as except for the one accidentally having dinner in the highest ranking restaurant that evening, the other N − 1 customers feel dissatisfied (as they had to take dinners in lower ranking restaurants; paying the same price for their dinners) and try to make a move next evening for a better dinner. This destabilises the above-mentioned "efficient" state or solution and the system starts again passing through the infinitely many socially inefficient states for long times. The number of agents not getting any dinner (unemployment measure), or equivalently, the number restaurants not getting any customer (unutilised service size) will fluctuate with time (evenings here). The average utilisation fractionsf in the typical cases considered in Sec. IV (where the distributions D(f ) are all Gaussian) have been analytically calculated. There are however, indications [5, 6] from the observations in the Hospital waiting list sizes, suggesting that the fluctuations can also show power law tails, although the two problems have significant differences (e.g., the absence of possibilities of iterative learning or the presence of heterogeneity of choices in the Hospital waiting list problem).
